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The Chinese and Canadian Prime Ministers signed the Canada-China bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT) in September 2012. This agreement was negotiated for many 
years, but it now appears that it will be some time before it is ratified. The Chinese 
authorities appear eager to ratify, but the Canadian government has held up 
ratification, at first for domestic political reasons and more recently due to the 
pending constitutional challenge of the BIT.1 
 
Thus, what initially appeared to be a major breakthrough in Canada-China economic 
relations and an important first step toward a full-fledged trade agreement has become 
something of a political headache for Canada’s government, and possibly a 
disappointment for China.  
 
The outlines of the Canada-China BIT are broadly similar to Chapter 11 of the China-
New Zealand Free Trade Agreement; those familiar with the Canadian and US Model 
BITs will recognize many familiar elements. The BIT contains many of the standard 
protections of the US and Canadian Models, broad commitment to investor-state 
arbitration and concern for public policy protection. The BIT also includes some 
novel provisions on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), such as an extensive list 
of requirements for arbitrators. However, one major difference is that the BIT affords 
scant protection to the pre-investment phase of foreign investment, since only the 
most-favored-nation treatment clause applies to pre-investment protections. Contrary 
to some other Canadian BITs, no right of establishment is provided. 
 
What are the implications of the Canada-China BIT for other major negotiations? The 
US BIT negotiations with China appear to have stalled. The Canada-China BIT goes 
some way toward meeting the objectives of the US Model BIT (e.g., China has 
accepted GATT-style exceptions) and should reassure those who are skeptical of the 
possibility of reaching an agreement with China that protects general public policy 
objectives. While the BIT does not go as far as the US Model BIT on a number of 
issues, such as the full definition of public policy protections, it does suggest that 
China is not averse to negotiating these issues. If pressed, China might be willing to 
go further than it has done with Canada to reach agreement with the US. The Canada-
 2 
China BIT and the Canada-EU BIT, which has been approved in principle and is 
undergoing legal review,2 should serve as valuable guides to negotiations with China. 
 
While the US will encounter many difficulties in the course of negotiating old and 
new issues with China or the EU, the principal lesson of the Canada-China BIT may 
be that these negotiations are moving into uncharted and politically challenging 
waters. Instead of praise for securing better access to the difficult Chinese market, the 
Canadian government was immediately vilified for committing itself to an unbalanced 
sellout of Canadian interests by opening Canada to investment by powerful Chinese 
state-owned enterprises that might run roughshod over Canadian national interests. 
The Harper government was so shocked that it put the ratification of the Canada-
China BIT and even the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) on hold, while giving priority to the Chinese takeover of Nexen. ICSID 
ratification subsequently took place in 2013,3 but ratification of the BIT is on hold—
despite Canada’s interests in improved investor protection in China.  
 
Apart from standards of foreign investment protection, critics have focused on the 
ISDS provisions in the Canada-China BIT. All the perceived sins of omission and 
commission in NAFTA Chapter 11 are seen to be multiplied in the BIT’s ISDS 
provisions. ISDS is seen as driven by occult corporate interests, conducted by faceless 
and irresponsible international arbitrators, procedurally opaque, undemocratic, and in 
contempt of Canadian courts. The whole process is criticized as undermining 
legitimate public policies and threatening a “regulatory chill,” exacerbating the 
perceived consequences of globalization and the hollowing out of the middle class. 
Canadian critics of NAFTA Chapter 11 have long advanced this thesis. The European 
Parliament, NGOs,4 US politicians,5 and Japan6 have now taken up this criticism. 
Should US and European governments fail to present a convincing response to this 
thesis, few politicians will be ready to stand up to defend ISDS and perhaps even 
BITs. Indeed, one cannot discount the possibility that Canada and the EU will not 
reach final agreement on ISDS. If this happens, we may well be seeing the last days 
of investor-state arbitration between liberal democracies. If this were the case, it could 
become very difficult to convince China that ISDS is essential in an agreement 
between the US and the Middle Kingdom. 
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1 Hupacasath First Nation v. Canada (Foreign Affairs), 2013 F.C. 900, available at 
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2014. 
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